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BANKRUPTCY
Hector Currie*
EFFECT OF DISCHARGE
Two courts of appeal have considered the recurring problem
of enforcement of judgments against discharged bankrupts. In
Mabry v. Beneficial Finance Co.,' action was begun by the credi-
tor on November 15, 1966, service was made on defendant the next
day, and a default judgment was taken on December 8, 1966.
Meantime, on December 1, 1966, the debtor had filed his petition
in bankruptcy. A discharge in bankruptcy was granted on Febru-
ary 2, 1967. Later, when the creditor sought to garnish wages of
the debtor, the latter brought action to enjoin enforcement of the
judgment. The district court denied an injunction. The court of
appeal reversed.
In holding for the creditor, the district court relied on Gumina
v. Dupas2 and Home Finance Service v. Taylor.8 The first was
an action by a discharged bankrupt to annul a default judgment
rendered about a year after the discharge in bankruptcy was
granted. The second, a garnishment proceeding in aid of a judg-
ment rendered against a discharged bankrupt more than a year
after his discharge, was met by assertion of the discharge in
bankruptcy as a defense. Instead of suffering judgment by de-
fault, each of these bankrupts should have pleaded his discharge
in bankruptcy as an affirmative defense.4 Having failed to do so,
he was bound by the judgment. Mabry, however, could not plead
a discharge granted only after judgment had been entered against
him. His opportunity came when the creditor sought to enforce
the judgment. Reliance on the Gumina and Taylor cases by the
district court was misplaced.
The court of appeal cited Louisiana Machinery Co. v. Pass-
man5 in support of its decision that Mabry was entitled to an
injunction. On March 24, 1952, Passman filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy and was adjudicated a bankrupt. On March 26, 1952, ac-
tion was begun against him in a state court where judgment by
default was obtained on May 28, 1952. On July 29, 1952, he re-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 215 So.2d 192 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
2. 178 So.2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
3. 187 So.2d 778 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
4. LA. CODS Civ. P. art. 1005.
5. 158 So.2d 419 (La. App. 3d Cir. 19683).
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ceived his discharge in bankruptcy. On May 18, 1962, an assignee
of the judgment sought to revive it. As Passman had not received
a discharge in bankruptcy when the judgment was obtained, he
was properly allowed to plead his discharge in the revival action.
Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Hurts7 was a garnishment pro-
ceeding in which, in effect, defendant pleaded his discharge in
bankruptcy as a defense. On December 11, 1964, defendant be-
came bankrupt. On December 15, 1964, plaintiff brought action
on a note, and on January 27, 1965, judgment was entered by de-
fault. On March 23, 1966, defendant received his discharge. On
April 12, 1966, plaintiff sought to garnish defendant's wages. As
defendant obviously could not have pleaded a discharge not yet
obtained, the court of appeal held that he had not lost his defense,
relying on the Passman case. Plaintiff, however, urged, in sup-
port of its argument of waiver, that defendant was required to
have the pending action stayed until a discharge was obtained,
then to plead the discharge. Section lla8 of the Bankruptcy Act
provides: "A suit which is founded upon a claim from which a
discharge would be a release, and which is pending against a
person at the time of the filing of a petition by or against him,
shall be stayed until an adjudication or the dismissal of the peti-
tion; if such person is adjudged bankrupt, such action may be
further stayed until the question of his discharge is determined
.... " Application for a stay may be made either to the bank-
ruptcy court or to the court in which the suit is pending," and
although section 11a refers only to actions pending when the
petition is filed, it is clear that the bankruptcy court can stay
new suits in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.' Obtaining
a stay of pending or new actions on claims that will be affected
by a discharge is generally the advisable course for the bankrupt,
but, as the court of appeal recognizes, it is not mandatory that
he seek a stay.
Collier summarizes the problem in these words: "Ordinarily,
it would seem that the better practice for the bankrupt to pursue
is, after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, to
procure a stay of all pending suits and those that may be brought
6. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2031.
7. 215 So.2d 560 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 29a (1964).
9. 8 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW § 3254 (1955) adds: "As a matter of
comity, it should first be made to the latter court." see also 1 W. COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY § 11.08 (1969).
10. 8 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW § 3263 (1955). see Bankruptcy Act §
2a(15), 11 U.S.C. § 11a(15) (1964).
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subsequent to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding,
where such suits are founded upon dischargeable claims, and
then, when the discharge is granted, to plead it. If the suit has not
been stayed, and a judgment is entered prior to the award of a
discharge, the discharge, when obtained, may be availed of as a
bar to further remedies on the judgment."1 1
If a judgment is entered after the award of a discharge, even
a short time afterwards, 12 and even where the suit was stayed
but the stay has expired, 18 and the bankrupt failed to plead dis-
charge in bankruptcy, he has lost his defense and he cannot pre-
vent enforcement of the judgment.14
DEBTS EXCEPTED FROM DISCHARGE
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act lists categories of debt not
affected by a discharge. Section 17a(2) provides:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts .... except such as . . . (2) are
liabilities for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations, or for obtaining money or property
on credit, or obtaining the extension or renewal of credit in
reliance upon a materially false statement in writing re-
specting his financial condition made or published or caused
to be made or published in any manner whatsoever with in-
tent to deceive ... 2915
The plaintiff in an action after bankruptcy on a properly
scheduled claim, where the debtor pleads his discharge, must be
able to show: "(1) That defendant made false representations;
(2) that these representations were made with the intention of
defrauding the plaintiff, and (3) that the plaintiff relied upon
and was misled by the false pretenses or representations."' 6
In two recent cases' 7 of this sort, the creditor prevailed. In
other instances, the action failed for want of proof of falsity, 8
11. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.32 (1969).
12. Carpenter v. X-L Finance Co., 195 So.2d 156 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
13. X-L Finance Co. v. Fenske, 197 So.2d 182 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
14. 8 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY LAw § 3240 (1955).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(2) (1964).
16. DeLatour v. Lala, 15 La. App. 276, 278, 131 So. 211, 212 (Orl. Cir. 1930).
17. Time Pay Plans v. Lacopulos, 218 So.2d 653 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969);
Foundation Plan v. Catchings, 218 So.2d 656 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
18. Southern Discount Co. v. Marchand, 218 So.2d 645 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969).
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fraudulent intent,19 or reliance by the plaintiff,20 or owing to
some combination of these elements.21
Section 17a (3) provides:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all of his provable debts . . .except such as . . . (3) have
not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance,
with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt,
unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the
proceedings in bankruptcy .... ,,22
Eagle Finance Corp. v. Duhon2 8 was an action begun on De-
cember 22, 1967, in which defendant answered on January 4, 1968,
alleging his bankruptcy on November 28, 1967. Defendant was
granted a discharge in bankruptcy on January 31, 1968, and was
allowed to amend his answer to plead the discharge. The court
of appeal held that plaintiff had notice of bankruptcy in time to
protect his rights in the bankruptcy court, and that his claim was
discharged whether or not it had been scheduled. In Shreveport
Wholesale Credit Men's Ass'n v. Quarles,24 however, defendant
was unable to prove actual knowledge of bankruptcy by the
holder of an unscheduled claim.
TRUSTEE'S POWERS OF AVOIDANCE
Holohan v. Durand25 was an action by a trustee in bankruptcy
against the bankrupt and the bankrupt's wife and daughter to
nullify as a simulation a sale of immovable property to the daugh-
ter. As the grantors reserved the usufruct for life, it was pre-
sumed that the sale was simulated.26 Even apart from the pre-
sumption, however, a simulated sale was established by the evi-
dence.
There are two sources in the Bankruptcy Act of the trustee's
19. Beneficial Finance Co. v. Cote, 216 So.2d 163 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
20. Carville PHS Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Jones, 221 So. 2d 905
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1969); Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Matherne, 217 So.2d
426 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Brantley, 211 So.2d 782
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
21. Texas Industries v. Pruett, 219 So.2d 813 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969) (no
proof of falsity or of reliance; the court also found no malicious injuries to
property within Section 17a(2); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Miller, 216 So.2d
100 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968) (no proof of fraudulent intent or of reliance).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 35a(3) (1964).
23. 216 So.2d 367 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968Y.
24. 212 So.2d 433 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
25. 220 So.2d 527 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
26. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2480.
[Vol. 30
1969] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1968-1969 271
power to avoid fraudulent conveyances. One is section 67d,2
largely derived from the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,8
which may be considered a re-statement of the common law of
fraudulent conveyances. 29 The other is section 70e, which pro-
vides in part: "A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred
by a debtor adjudged a bankrupt under this Act which, under any
Federal or State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as against
or voidable for any other reason by any creditor of the debtor,
having a claim provable under this Act, shall be null and void
as against the trustee of such debtor."30 In most states, the law of
fraudulent conveyances, made available to trustees in bankruptcy
through section 70e, is substantially similar to section 67d; in
Louisiana, however, trustees in bankruptcy often have a choice
of substantive law.81 The transfer in Holohan v. Durand could
have been attacked under section 67d had it not been made more
than a year before bankruptcy 82 and promptly recorded.3 8 As it
was, the trustee necessarily invoked section 70e.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Robert A. Pascal*
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
The decision in Liebendorfer v. Gayle' raises a fascinating
question which the writer finds difficult to answer. Husband and
wife, Louisiana domiciliaries, were separated from bed and board
in Louisiana and some months later a conventional partition of
community assets was executed by them. Thereafter the wife
secured from an Arkansas court a divorce judgment in which
the conventional partition was "incorporated"-apparently at
her request, without opposition of the husband, and without alle-
gation of its defect or invalidity by either spouse. Following this
the wife sought a Louisiana declaration of the nullity of the par-
tition, alleging fraud on the husband's part in the classification
27. 11 U.S.C. § 107d (1964).
28. 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 48 (1957).
29. 4 W. COLER, BANKRUPTCY § 67.29[2J (1967).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 110e (1964).
31. For a discussion of differences between the common law of fraudulent
conveyances and the Louisiana law, see Currie, The First Act of Bankruptcy
in Louisiana, 27 LA. L. REv. 16 (1966).
32. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107d(2) (1964).
33. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(5), 11 U.S.C. § 107d(5) (1964).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 217 So.2d 37 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied.
